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ABSTRACT 
The decision by American Presidents to use military force is a decision that is not 
taken lightly nor whimsically. This study attempted to determine whether any personal or 
psychological characteristics influence the President’s decision to use military force or to 
refrain from using military force. While other factors could influence the President’s 
decision, I believed that individual factors including personal and psychological 
characteristics would be able to most effectively explain the use of military force. Uses of 
military force were collected from a Congressional Research Service report listing all uses of 
military force from 1798 to 2015. The uses of force by each President were then cross-
tabulated with the individual factors I was investigating. Based on the previous findings by 
Michael C. Horowitz, Allan C. Stam, and Cali M. Ellis that showed correlation between a 
leader’s personal experiences and the use of military force, I hypothesized that there would 
be similar findings among American Presidents. The results show that individual factors and 
personal characteristics may give little indication or its effects are overstated as to whether a 
President is more prone to use military force or less prone to use military force. Many of the 
results contradict existing literature, but due to the small sample size of American 
presidencies the results may not be truly representative. At best, it can be inferred that 
American Presidents aren’t as significantly affected by individual factors and personal 
characteristics compared to other world leaders and that other factors of explanation hold 
equal importance. Future research areas that may merit investigation include Presidential 
verbal syntax and operational coding. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
OPERATION EAGLE CLAW 
 
November 4, 1979, was the beginning of the end of President Jimmy Carter’s political 
career in public office, although President Carter himself likely had no idea how much the 
Iranian Hostage Crisis would prove to be his downfall. It was on this day that the American 
embassy in Tehran, Iran was stormed by a revolutionary student group that had supported the 
previous year’s revolution that toppled the American backed Shah Reza Pahlavi. Fifty-two 
Americans were now held hostage. Military options were considered almost immediately, 
ranging from a declaration of war1, a naval blockade, mining Iranian ports, and even a proposal 
to send in the 82nd Airborne Division to Tehran and marching on the embassy to free the 
hostages.2 Before any military action was taken, President Carter attempted to free the hostages 
through peaceful means by releasing a six-point plan, one of which hesitantly offered to address 
grievances with Iran in exchange for the safe release of the hostages.3 After a deal could not be 
reached, the United States broke diplomatic relations with Iran. Initially unwilling to take 
military action Carter now believed a diplomatic solution was impossible.4 
Three meetings were held in 1980, on March 22, April 11, and April 15, where the 
decisions to use military force to free the hostages were taken. The initial estimates for the 
probability of success were literally “zero.”5 On average, there were nine participants in these 
meetings. On the orders of the President, a joint operation was undertaken. Despite the Carter 
                                                 
1 Despite the United States’ willingness to actively use force, Congress has only declared war on five occasions. The 
last time the United States declared war on any countries was during World War II in 1942 when war was declared 
on the minor Axis powers of Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania.  
2 Charles G. Cogan, “Desert One and Its Disorders” The Journal of Military History (2003): 205. 
3 ibid. 207. 
4 ibid. 208. 
5 Steve Smith, “Policy Preferences and Bureaucratic Position: The Case of the American Hostage Rescue Mission” 
in The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence (Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield). 
345. 
2 
 
administration publicly pressing for a negotiated settlement, the planning process for a rescue 
mission began two days after the hostages were taken, on November 6, 1979. 
Smith describes President Carter as more than just a bureaucratic actor and that he could 
act in a way based on his personal influences.6 Carter wanted to avoid any blatant use of 
American military force yet the American public was pressuring him to “do something.”7 
Because 1980 was an election year, he faced intense criticism from the Republican Party and 
even from within the Democratic Party as he was being challenged by Senator Ted Kennedy in a 
bitter primary election. Because of Carter’s fears that the hostages would not be freed until after 
1980 and therefore after the election in November, Carter decided he could no longer wait. Smith 
describes Carter’s actions as a response to his desire to be reelected, his perception of 
responsibility, and protecting American national honor.8 He added that “Clearly, Carter’s 
personality was an important factor.”9 
The Hawks in Carter’s cabinet included National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski 
and Defense Secretary Harold Brown. Per Smith they took their positions based on a 
bureaucratic framework. The Doves included Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, who vehemently 
opposed the mission, a position Smith believed also was taken due to his bureaucratic position as 
the hostages were mostly from the State Department. He voiced his objections in the meeting 
that occurred on April 15 but was met by a “deafening silence” from those in attendance.10 
Brzezinski noted that “In a way, the decision had been foreshadowed by the discussion initiated 
at the March 22 briefing at Camp David. From that date on, the rescue mission became the 
obvious option if negotiations failed—and on that point there was almost unanimous consent 
                                                 
6 ibid. 349 
7 ibid. 
8 ibid. 350. 
9 ibid. 
10 ibid. 356. 
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within the top echelons of the Administration.”11 As always, the President had made the final 
decision; the President’s cabinet and advisors serve at his pleasure. Secretary of State Vance 
tendered his resignation to Carter on April 21 after he had been clearly marginalized by the 
Carter administration. Per their agreement, the resignation would not become public until after 
the rescue mission no matter its outcome.12 
There were two deadlines imposed upon the planners of the mission. By May 1 there 
would be only sixteen minutes of darkness more than required for the mission and by May 10 the 
temperature would be too high and likely affect helicopter performance.13 The planners 
recommended April 24 as the mission date. On that date, Operation Eagle Claw commenced. 
Special forces from 1st Special Forces Operation Detachment-Delta, the Delta Force, would be 
ferried by Air Force C-130 transport aircraft to an improvised airstrip in the desert known as 
Desert One. From here, they would be transported by eight Navy RH-53 Sea Stallion helicopters 
that would have arrived from the USS Nimitz to Desert Two, located about 50 miles southeast of 
Tehran. Then, the CIA would procure trucks and drivers to transport the Delta operators to the 
embassy and Foreign ministry, where three other hostages were held, to conduct their assault. 
Problems arose shortly into the mission. Of the eight helicopters launched from the 
Nimitz, one experienced mechanical issues and was forced to land short of Desert One while 
another turned around after the pilot became severely disoriented after a severe dust storm 
known as a haboob caught the helicopter pilots completely by surprise. Upon arrival at Desert 
One, one helicopter was determined to be too dangerous to fly. With only five helicopters 
remaining, the commanders on the ground recommended that the mission be aborted.14 
                                                 
11 ibid. 348. 
12 ibid. 356. 
13 ibid. 347. 
14 Charles G. Cogan, “Desert One and Its Disorders” The Journal of Military History (2003): 213. 
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The White House was now aware of the situation. Brzezinski briefly contemplated 
recommending to the President to proceed with the mission outright but decided to leave the fate 
of the mission to the commanders on the ground. Per their recommendation, President Carter 
ordered the mission to be called off. Distraught, Carter put his head down onto the Resolute desk 
in utter disbelief without the knowledge of what would happen next.15 Immediately after the 
mission was aborted, one of the helicopters accidently collided with a parked C-130 and 
exploded, killing eight people. Operation Eagle Claw had been a complete failure. The political 
fallout was immediate, Secretary of State Vance’s resignation was made public and Congress 
and the American public were demanding answers. The hostages were then dispersed to multiple 
locations to prevent any future rescue attempts by the United States. The resulting aftermath of 
Eagle Claw, occurring in an election year, produced fatal electoral consequences for the Carter 
presidency. Former California Governor Ronald Reagan was elected in November 1980 by a 
landslide, claiming 489 electoral votes to Carter’s 49. To add insult to injury, the American 
hostages were released hours after President Carter left office on January 20, 1981. 
The Decision to Use Force – Factors that Influence the President’s Decision 
As seen by the previous example, the decision by the President to use force and send 
American servicemen and women into harm’s way is not a decision that is taken lightly nor is it 
taken whimsically. Carter had agonized over the use of force and made several attempts to avoid 
using it. The decision is a calculated and collaborative decision between the President’s cabinet 
and formal advisors in the Executive Office or the President’s long-time trustees who hold no 
formal political office. If a war proves to be unpopular or the military action proves to be a 
disastrous failure like Operation Eagle Claw was for President Carter, the electoral consequences 
would be severe if not career-ending. 
                                                 
15 ibid. 214. 
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I have identified at least five factors of explanation or analysis that may explain the 
President’s propensity to use force. These five factors are individual, societal, governmental, 
bureaucratic, and external factors. Each of these factors could be determinants of whether the 
decision is made to use force. The purpose of my research is not to deny that each of these 
factors may assist in explaining the President’s decision to use force. Instead, I will advance an 
argument about why individual factors may be the most potent explanation. 
Individual Factors 
The individual influences on the office are made possible by the Constitution’s 
deliberately vague wording. The framers were fearful of creating a tyrannical government that 
they had previously fought to rid themselves of in the Revolutionary War. The powers of the 
Presidency are succinctly described in Article II of the Constitution. Article II, Section 1, Clause 
1 states that “The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. 
He shall hold his Office during the Term of four Years, and, together with the Vice President, 
chosen for the same Term…” Article II, Section 2, Clause 1 designates the President as the 
“…Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of several 
States.” Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 grants the President the power to make treaties with 
foreign countries with advice and consent of the Senate. Article II, Section 3 concludes by 
declaring that “…he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed, and shall Commission 
all the Officers of the United States.” 
There are many other clauses in Article II that detail how the President is elected, when 
the election of the President will occur, who is eligible to hold the office, a plan of succession in 
case of a vacancy, how much the President will be paid, the oath of office that must be taken, 
appointing judges and officers, the ability to grant pardons and reprieves, and delivering a State 
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of the Union address. The only reference to the powers and duties of the President were in 
Section 1 Clause 1, Section 2 Clauses 1 and 2, and Section 3. This leaves the powers of the 
Presidency open to differing interpretations. 
How exactly the President can operate has been debated over the entirety of American 
history by the court systems, academics, and even by the Presidents themselves. Then a 
Professor at the time, Woodrow Wilson believed the President “has the right, in law and 
conscience, to be as big a man as he can” and that “only his capacity will set the limit.”16 In a 
similar vein, President Theodore Roosevelt stated his belief was that it was his right and duty to 
do anything that the nation needed unless it was unconstitutional or forbidden by law. President 
William Howard Taft, however, had a strict constructionist view of the office and how the 
President could operate, by writing “The true view of the executive functions is, as I conceive it, 
that the president can exercise no power which cannot be fairly and reasonably traced to some 
specific grant of power… Such specific grant must be either in the federal constitution or in an 
act of Congress passed in pursuance thereof.”17 
There are numerous factors at an individual level that could influence the decision to use 
force. The nature of the office, having no formal requirements or qualifications other than those 
laid out in the Constitution in Article II Section 1 Clause 5, allows for the office to be personally 
tailored to the personality of the President. The forty-four men who have served as President 
came from many different backgrounds and upbringings. The previous career paths of Presidents 
have ranged from farmers, lawyers, soldiers and officers, academics, and businessmen among 
                                                 
16 Woodrow Wilson, Constitutional Government in the United States. (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 
1908), 202, 205. 
17 William Howard Taft, Our Chief Magistrate and His Powers (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 
1916), 139–140. 
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many others. It may be plausible to suggest that a President’s previous political history and 
personal experience would shape the decision to use force. 
Societal Factors 
For force to be used, the President may find it necessary to cite public opinion as a 
reasoning to use force or cite public opinion as a reason to not use force. In How Public Opinion 
Constrains the Use of Force, Matthew A. Baum argues that public opinion and scrutiny could 
inhibit Presidents from using force as a foreign policy tool.18 The American public views direct 
military involvement only as a last resort reserved for extreme circumstances.19 The American 
public also tends to make a decision on support for use of force on a case by case basis, 
supporting use of force against Iraq if Saudi Arabia were to be invaded yet disapproved the 
potential use of force against North Korea if South Korea were to be invaded.20 The President, by 
nature of his office and the platform that he has, has the potential to make his case to the 
American public and shape public opinion in his favor. 
I do not believe that societal factors are the most important considerations in the use of 
force, but I readily admit that certain risk-averse trends such as the Vietnam Syndrome could 
have resulted in fewer instances of the use of force. My reasoning for societal factors not being 
as important is that ultimately the President does not require the approval of the public to use 
force. The use of force in fact can retroactively raise public support; 32% of the American public 
supported President George H.W. Bush’s use of force against Panama in 1989 prior to the 
invasion. After the invasion, public support skyrocketed to 82.5%.21 
                                                 
18 Matthew A. Baum, “How Public Opinion Constrains the Use of Force: The Case of Operation Restore Hope.” 
Presidential Studies Quarterly Vol. 34, No. 2 (2004): 187. 
19 Catherine M. Kelleher “Soldering on: U.S. Public Opinion on the Use of Force.” The Brookings Review Vol. 12, 
No. 2 (1994): 27. 
20 ibid. 
21 Bruce W. Jentleson, “The Pretty Prudent Public: Post Post-Vietnam American Opinion on the Use of Military 
Force.” International Studies Quarterly Vol. 36, No. 1 (1992): 55. 
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Governmental and Bureaucratic Factors 
Institutional support, namely from Congress, may be another determinant in the use of 
force. The President may be more willing to use force when his party has a majority in the House 
and Senate. Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 grants Congress the sole power to declare war. There 
have been only five declared wars in American history: the War of 1812, the Mexican-American 
War, the Spanish-American War, World War I, and World War II. 
But the powers of the Presidency seemed to always make the Congressional 
responsibility to declare war unnecessary. Chief Justice Roger Taney, in his opinion of the 1850 
Supreme Court case Fleming v. Page, made a clear distinction between the power of the 
Presidency and the power of a monarchy with regards to war making and conquest, as there is to 
be a distribution of power between the various departments as well as Congress. Initially 
Congress was designated the power to “make” war during the debates at the Constitutional 
convention until it was realized that Presidents in times of emergency may need to direct the 
military without being able to consult with Congress.22 One may cynically determine that a 
President could in fact interpret “emergencies” as he so pleased to suit his motives. Such an 
interpretation did in fact occur in 1818, as a “defensive war” was conducted without 
Congressional approval by President James Monroe in the First Seminole War. The Supreme 
Court later affirmed the President’s authority in Martin v. Mott to “…decide whether exigency 
has arisen.”23 Congressional power had already been ceded. 
In a well-meaning attempt to reign in Presidential war powers and the use of force, the 
War Powers Resolution was passed by Congress in 1973 and made law after overriding President 
Richard Nixon’s veto. The Resolution’s stated purpose was to “insure that the collective 
                                                 
22 Louis Fisher, Presidential War Power: Third Edition, Revised. (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2013), 
8. 
23 Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. 12 Wheat. 19 (1827) 
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judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United States 
Armed Forces into hostilities.”24 The War Powers Resolution in fact strengthened the ability of 
the President to use force as Congress had no enforcement power to stop him. It requires the 
President to notify Congress within 48 hours of deployment of the armed forces. If not approved 
by Congress, the President is given a 60-day time limit to direct the armed forces essentially 
however he sees fit and then has 30 days to withdraw them from action. 
Institutional support may give the President the political capital he needs to use force. But 
the President, just as the case is in my review of societal factors, will often act without the 
approval or support of Congress by instead citing his constitutional powers or the bylaws and 
resolutions of international bodies such as the United Nations. I do not believe government and 
bureaucratic factors alone explain the use of force. 
External Factors 
Without question, there have been times in the history of the Presidency where external 
factors and events have strongly influenced the President to act in self-defense and use force as a 
retaliatory measure. The United States bombing of Libya on April 15, 1986, was ordered by 
President Ronald Reagan as retaliation for the bombing of a Berlin discotheque frequented by 
American servicemen ten days previously by agents of the Libyan government. President Bill 
Clinton also ordered a missile strike on June 26, 1993 against the Iraqi Intelligence Services 
headquarters in Baghdad in response to an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate former President 
George H.W. Bush in April 1993.25 Perhaps there could be some personal characteristics in both 
President Reagan and President Clinton that would have further provided reason for them to use 
force in these situations, but when there are significant attacks against Americans or American 
                                                 
24 War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C Chapter 33 (1973).  
25 Congressional Research Service, United States of America, Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces 
Abroad, 1798-2015, Washington D.C., United States of America, 2015, 18. 
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interests even the most passive of Presidents would be provoked into responding. The Japanese 
attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 that drew the United States into World War II and 
the terrorist attacks perpetuated by Al Qaeda on September 11, 2001 that saw the United States 
launch the Global War on Terrorism would be the two most obvious examples where the 
President would face overwhelming political and public pressure and have no choice but to 
retaliate with force or ask Congress to declare war. 
Investigation of Individual Factors 
I believe individual factors would be able to most effectively explain the use of force, and 
the overall goal of my research is to determine the President of the United States’ propensity to 
use force. Many questions could be asked including whether psychological characteristics, 
previous military experience, previous foreign policy experience, previous occupation, previous 
higher education status, age, and political party membership play a role in determining when the 
President will use military force. I have used the Congressional Research Service’s report 
“Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad” to determine what actions taken by 
Presidents are considered uses of force. I have selected a few instances listed in the article that I 
believe were significantly influenced by individual factors. 
 “Mr. Madison’s War” – The War of 1812 and Congressional Cooperation 
On June 18, 1812, the United States declared a state of war between themselves and the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. Among the issues leading to the war were British 
interception of neutral ships and blockades of the United States during British hostilities with 
France.26 Another major issue was the impressment of Americans into the British Navy. 
                                                 
26 Congressional Research Service, Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2015. 2. 
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Brien Hallet writes that the congressional power to declare war could not be exercised 
without strong and insistent presidential leadership and decision making.27 It’s without question 
that Congress was very reluctant to declare war on Great Britain; the final vote tallies were 79-49 
in the House and 19-13 in the Senate to declare war. President James Madison, a Democratic-
Republican, had to intensely lobby Congress to declare war. While Hallet writes that the 
interception of neutral ships was a very real issue, he asks why anyone would care about this 
issue outside of New England since this issue rarely affected other states and regions.28 President 
Madison along with other war hawks attempted to frame the approaching war as a “second 
revolutionary war.”29 
While President Madison was 58 years old when he took office in 1809, it is important to 
note that Congress was composed mostly of members who were of young age during the 
Revolution. Hallet describes that these young Congressmens’ desire for war was not based on 
any knowledge and was a spontaneous expression of youthful enthusiasm and optimism which 
resulted in a burgeoning nationalism of the new young America.30 James Madison himself was 
25 years old when the Declaration of Independence was signed, making him one of the youngest 
Founding Fathers. This is in stark contrast to John Adams, a Federalist who was 41 years old at 
the time of the signing of the Declaration of Independence, who paid a dear political price for his 
decision to avoid a major war with France during his Presidency. This could explain Madison’s 
enthusiasm for pursuing war like the other war hawks. Despite neither side losing any major 
pieces of territory, President Madison’s rush to war resulted in few positives as the United States 
lost numerous battles and saw the capital of Washington DC and the White House burnt to the 
                                                 
27 Brien Hallet, Declaring War: Congress, The President, And What The Constitution Does Not Say. (Cambridge, 
NY: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 12. 
28 ibid. 15. 
29 ibid. 
30 ibid. 22-23. 
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ground by the British. All Federalist Congressmen and Senators voted against the declaration of 
war and derisively referred to the war as “Mr. Madison’s War.” 
The Korean War – Congressional Indifference 
“We are not at war.” Said President Harry S. Truman in response to a question by a 
reporter asking whether the United States was at war in Korea.31 President Truman instead 
characterized the Korean War as a “police action.” Truman had ordered the United States to 
intervene in the Korean peninsula in June 1950 after North Korea invaded South Korea by citing 
UN Security Council Resolution 84 that called for all UN members to assist South Korea by all 
necessary means.32 President Truman did not seek the approval of members of Congress for his 
military actions in Korea.33 
The reaction by Congress was largely indifference. Senator Scott Lucas of Illinois stated 
on the floor of the Senate in 1950 that in the past Presidents had frequently used force without 
Congressional authorization.34 Louis Fisher, in Presidential War Power, states that these past 
actions were not even close to the magnitude of the Korean War.35 Presidential interpretation of 
the Constitution had slowly transformed from the ability to repel sudden attacks to what Edward 
S. Corwin described as an “Undefined power … to employ without Congressional authorization 
the armed forces in the protection of American rights and interests abroad whenever necessary.36 
The war proved to be very unpopular for the Truman administration and he did not seek 
reelection, ending approximately twenty years of Democratic control of the White House. 
 
                                                 
31 Fisher, Presidential War Power: Third Edition, Revised, 245. 
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The Gulf War – Fait Accompli 
 On August 9, 1990, President George H.W. Bush reported that he had ordered the 
deployment of US Armed Forces to the Persian Gulf region to defend Saudi Arabia after the 
invasion of Kuwait by Iraq one week prior; he continued to report on the buildup of forces.37 
Congress would eventually authorize the use of force against Iraq on January 12, 1991. On 
January 18, 1991, US and Coalition forces began their air campaign followed shortly afterwards 
by the ground campaign that saw the Iraqi Army, the world’s fifth largest at the time, routed in a 
mere one hundred hours. 
One might observe that the fact that the Gulf War was authorized by Congress discredits 
my belief that individual characteristics of the Presidents most effectively explain why force is 
used and instead should be tallied as an example of a bureaucratic factor due to institutional 
support. I disagree, as does Michael J. Glennon in “The Gulf War and the Constitution.” 
Glennon describes the process as jury rigged and as a unilateral commitment by President 
George H.W. Bush to defend Saudi Arabia and then liberate Kuwait.38 After President Bush 
announced an offensive troop buildup on November 8, 1990, Glennon argues that Bush’s actions 
may have been a fait accompli for Congress as Bush was dead set on war no matter if Congress 
approved it or not.39 
Obama and Libya – Congressional Irrelevancy 
On March 21, 2011, President Barack Obama submitted to Congress a report “consistent 
with the War Powers Resolution” stating that US military forces commenced operations in Libya 
on March 19, 2011, in line with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973.40 The 
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resolution authorized all necessary means to protect civilians and civilian populated areas from 
the Libyan government led by Muammar Gaddafi. 
The Republican-controlled House of Representatives and Democratic-controlled Senate 
failed to pass any authorizations for the use of force in Libya and by May 2011 the 60-day time 
limit to conduct military operations that the War Powers Resolution imposed had expired. By 
June 2011, the 30-day time limit that allowed for the withdrawal of armed forces also expired. 
The House passed a resolution that called for President Obama to submit a report to the House 
within 14 days describing US national security interests in Libya, including the “President’s 
justification for not seeking authorization by Congress for the use of military force in Libya.”41 
The White House responded with a lengthy statement which said that “…the President had 
constitutional authority, as Commander in Chief, and Chief Executive and pursuant to his foreign 
affairs powers, to direct such limited military operations abroad.”42 Fisher notes that “Presidents 
go to great lengths to explain to Congress and the public their reasoning’s to circumvent 
constitutional principles. 43 
When Force is Not Used and “The President as King” 
 
Just as the Presidents from prior examples showed they had the means to use military 
force with or without Congressional approval, they can also choose not to use military force. 
While inferences from some of these examples can be made to support the viewpoint that uses of 
military force are decisions made by institutions and not the leaders of those institutions, there is 
literature to suggest otherwise. Richard E. Neustadt, in Presidential Power, noted that despite the 
rise of what has been described as the “institutionalized Presidency” by the introduction of the 
Executive Office of the President, the “…sporting chance to do the chores of office will not 
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automatically turn doing into influence.”44 Furthermore, the presence of a National Security 
Council did not further deter President Harry S. Truman’s handling of the Korean War.45 That is 
not to suggest the President rules absolutely without input from his cabinet and other advisors 
but that the President “…must become his own director of his own central intelligence.”46 
However, Stephen D. Krasner describes Neustadt’s approach in Are Bureaucracies Important as 
portraying “…the American president as trapped by a permanent government more enemy than 
ally.47 In essence, a President is no longer able to control the organizations around them for they 
have “…incompatible national, bureaucratic, political and personal objectives.”48  Krasner 
disagrees stating that the bureaucratic interpretation of foreign policy is “misleading, dangerous 
and compelling: misleading because it obscures the power of the president; dangerous because it 
undermines the assumptions of democratic politics by relieving high officials of responsibility.49 
Krasner states that if elected officials like the President are not responsible for the decisions they 
make then it makes little sense that voters would vote them out of office. Why vote someone out 
of office, Krasner asks, “…when his successor, regardless of his values, will be trapped in the 
same web of only incrementally mutable standard operating procedures?”50 He continues to note 
that if the “machine” were responsible for all uses of military force that turn into disasters, the 
voting public would have feelings of sympathy and not feelings of vengefulness.  
Even in his book Essence of Decision, a work that analyzes the decision-making 
processes of the Kennedy administration during the Cuban Missile Crisis, Graham Allison wrote 
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decisions weren’t made entirely on the basis of bureaucratic positions but also on personal 
interests.51 Despite Allison’s belief that Kennedy’s decisions during the crisis were mostly 
determined by the Executive Committee of the National Security Council or ExComm, he does 
state that President Kennedy did in fact veto a decision to bomb a SAM base.52 Krasner believes 
that “In general, bureaucratic analysts ignore the critical effect which the president has in 
choosing his advisers, establishing their access to decision making, and influencing bureaucratic 
interests.”53 
Because the President can pick his advisors, he could therefore in theory compel them to 
do as he wishes or find someone else who will. As it relates to individual personalities of the 
Presidents and decision making, Krasner writes that “The President may even resort to his own 
knowledge and sense of history to find options which his bureaucracy fails to present. Even 
when Presidential attention is totally absent, bureaus are sensitive to his values. Policies which 
violate presidential objectives may bring presidential wrath.”54 Krasner believes the President 
defines his own role and that a different man can choose differently and that to say the office of 
President determined Kennedy’s decisions or any President’s decision to use force is “to both 
underrate his power and to relieve him of responsibility.”55 Krasner concludes that the final 
decision was with the President because “the elimination of the non-forcible options was a 
reflection of Kennedy’s values.”56 
Direction of the Research 
 In the forthcoming chapters, I will further investigate individual factors. I will investigate 
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whether there is any impact on their war-related decisions from their political party, average age, 
last political office, previous foreign policy experience, previous military experience, completion 
of higher education, occupation, and psychological characteristics from the NEO Revised 
Personality Inventory including neuroticism, extraversion, openness to experience, 
agreeableness, and conscientiousness. I will explain why such individual factors are important 
through existing literature. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THEORY – DO INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS MATTER? 
 
Existing literature does express support that individual characteristics matter with regards 
to the decision to use military force. In Why Leaders Fight, Michael C. Horowitz, Allan C. Stam, 
and Cali M. Ellis state that “New research in behavioral psychology…suggests that individuals’ 
early experiences profoundly shape their choices later in their lives.”57 This is particularly 
important with regards to American Presidents, and the authors note the differences between the 
candidates from the 2004, 2008, and 2012 Presidential elections. The authors also state that 
leaders reason by analogy through their background experiences especially in cases regarding 
foreign policy as information is not always readily available in times of crisis, thus forcing 
leaders to rely on past experience.58 They dispute the institutionalist arguments that state leaders 
are prisoners to the end-goals of institutions and they provide an extreme example to highlight 
their disagreement. They state that per institutionalist theory, the institutions of Germany in the 
1930s were “…so powerful as to overcome the potential preferences of any leader who would 
come to power during that time.”59 This line of reasoning from institutionalists could imply that 
Adolf Hitler was a victim of the existing institutions in Germany and had no hand in the actions 
taken that would eventually trigger World War II. A less extreme and more contemporary 
example, the American-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, is also viewed skeptically by Robert Jervis 
who argued in “Do Leaders Matter and How Would We Know?” that the invasion would have 
preceded as planned even if George W. Bush wasn’t President.60 
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Risk and the “Big Five” Psychological Characteristics 
 Horowitz et al. use the psychological definition of risk that says “individuals who are 
more likely to make choices in which high costs as well as high potential gains are at stake in 
situations where others would hesitate to act.”61 To explain what makes someone risk-averse or 
risk-acceptant, the authors cite the five-factor model of personality. These “big five” factors 
include neuroticism, extraversion, openness to experience, conscientiousness, and agreeableness. 
These factors, along with personal life experience, are well established in psychology literature 
as being influences on individual behavior and attitudes.62 These big five psychological can be 
quantified via the Revised NEO Personality Inventory. 
Neuroticism is a personality trait that attempts to determine levels of anxiety. Facets of 
neuroticism include anxiety, angry hostility, depression, self-consciousness, impulsiveness, and 
vulnerability.63 Extraversion measures how social an individual is. Facets of extraversion include 
warmth, gregariousness, assertiveness, activity, excitement seeking, and positive emotions. 
Openness to experience “contrasts poets, philosophers, and artists with farmers, machinists, and 
‘down-to-earth’ people.”64 Facets of openness to experience include openness to fantasy, 
openness to aesthetics, openness to feelings, openness to actions, openness to ideas, and 
openness to values.65 Openness to experience is the only dimension of the “big five” that is 
related to intelligence. Agreeableness measures how individuals work with others. Facets of 
agreeableness include trust, straight-forwardness, altruism, compliance, modesty, and tender-
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mindedness.66 Conscientiousness measures inner thought. Facets of conscientiousness include 
competence, order, dutifulness, achievement striving, self-discipline, and deliberation.67 
As no former or current American President would even consider participating in a 
psychological study for a research article, psychological scores of the big five factors are open to 
interpretation by those who attempt to assign scores to the Presidents. As Paul A. Kowert notes 
in “Where ‘Does’ the Buck Stop?: Assessing The Impact of Presidential Personality,” there is 
difficulty in establishing “relationships between personality, performance, and political 
outcomes.”68 However, I’ve found the work of Rubenzer and Faschingbauer to be the best 
approximation of psychological characteristics of the Presidents. Only thirty Presidents were 
assigned psychological character scores as Rubenzer and Faschingbauer required that each 
President have at least three experts assign them percentile scores in the various categories. 
Rubenzer and Faschingbauer did not link these psychological characteristics to the use of 
military force but they did state that certain percentile scores could predict a successful 
presidency.  
The Importance of Military Experience 
Horowitz et al. believe military experience has a “…powerful and systematic impact on 
leaders’ behavior once they reach office.”69 By serving in the military, future leaders become 
familiar by personally leading military operations that they themselves may have to order when 
they later become civilian leaders. Military service can also be a very traumatic experience if one 
experiences combat. Because of the stark differences between civilian and military leadership 
during the Cold War, the authors believe this provides evidence to support their claims that 
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military experience matters as a determinant for the decision to use military force.70 Military 
experience may make an individual more comfortable in using military force while combat 
experience may temper a leaders decision to use military force.71 Military experience in turn may 
also cause leaders to become more cautious citing General Dwight D. Eisenhower’s belief that 
war was a last resort in extreme circumstances.72 
Peter D. Feaver and Christopher Gelpi also wrote extensively on military experience and 
the propensity to use force in the book “Choosing Your Battles.” They argue that “…service in 
the U.S. military is an important socialization experience that shapes individuals’ attitudes” and 
that they “do not appear to be forgotten when individuals leave the military and enter civilian 
life.”73 They concluded that American policymakers with military experience would be less 
likely to use military force and those that did use military force would be likelier to use higher 
levels of force.74 
The Importance of Education 
Horowitz et al. write that education can influence the behavior of leaders but note there 
are conflicting results for whether education levels influence the decision to use military force. 
However, they cite a survey that shows “…a clear linear trend with higher levels of education 
making respondents less likely to view China as a threat and less likely to think that the use of 
military force against China would be an effective policy action.”75 Assuming the survey data are 
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correct, the authors are led to believe that “The higher a leader’s educational level, the lower the 
probability that the leader will use force against his or her neighbors.”76 
The Importance of Prior Occupation 
Horowitz et al. write that “A leader’s occupation before his or her entry into politics is 
one of the clearest ways to conceptualize the socialization of a leader.”77 They cite the work of 
psychologists Caspi and Roberts but also note the potential of a selection effect since most 
people will pick an occupation that aligns cleanly with their personality. As it relates to risk-
taking, there isn’t any compelling literature to suggest there is a correlation. The authors argue 
that lawyers could be less likely to use military force owing to the belief that a lawyer may be 
more aware of opposing opinions; however, lawyers could also be more inclined to use military 
force owing to confidence in their own abilities.78 
The Importance of Age 
Citing previous research, Horowitz et al. state that there is a correlation between age and 
a leader’s behavior in international conflict situations.79 They explain the prevailing trope that 
younger leaders take more risks while older leaders are tempered by experience and thus take 
fewer risks. The authors once again point to psychology, where evidence would suggest higher 
levels of testosterone has a positive relationship between physical and emotional aggression.80 
As one ages, testosterone levels will decrease and therefore in theory less physical and emotional 
aggression. However, the question whether younger leaders or older leaders are more prone to 
using military force is not as straightforward as it may seem. Horowitz himself wrote in his 
previous research, “Leader Age, Regime Type, and Violent International Relations,” that older 
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leaders were more likely to use military force. One possible explanation they discussed was time 
horizons, essentially people are more likely to prefer choices with short term benefits than long 
term benefits. They argue that a younger leader has a longer time horizon, because they may 
remain in office or return to office later, they would be more likely to delay a risky decision.81 
An older leader would have a shorter time horizon for they may soon be relinquishing power or 
pass away and therefore would be more likely to make risky decisions to solidify their legacy.82 
Time horizons may not be limited to just elder leaders. One of the best examples of a short time 
horizon in a young President would be President John F. Kennedy. President Kennedy suffered 
from numerous health issues including Addison’s disease which can be treated but has no known 
cures. 
They also explain younger leaders may be more constrained by existing institutions 
because their assumption of power could have in part due to political patronage while older 
leaders have more institutional freedom due to their existing credibility and experience.83 Their 
research found that “As the age of the leader of state A increases, the initiation and use of force 
against state B becomes more likely” although they could not determine with statistical 
significance if this would lead to an escalation to war.84 One leader they cited to support their 
theory was President Ronald Reagan, the oldest President to be elected in American history. 
After nearly being struck down by an assassin’s bullet, President Reagan felt he had a “mission” 
to fulfil and said that “Perhaps having come so close to death made me feel I should do whatever 
I could in the years God had given me to reduce the threat of nuclear war…”85 During his eight 
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years in office, Reagan presided over an increase in military spending because he was driven to 
leave a legacy that included his vision of the United States having won the Cold War over the 
Soviet Union.86 
Conclusions 
Horowitz et al. do not claim that the previous characteristics are the sole explanations for 
why a leader would choose to use military force. They admit that “Neither history nor pure 
statistical correlations can give us clear-cut affirmative answers” but go on to explain that it 
shows “…leaders are not always buffeted by the forces of history, are not always overwhelmed 
by the constraints of material power, and are not automatons carrying out the desires of their 
selectorate.”87 It would be reasonable to believe that perhaps some, but not all, individual 
characteristics may explain whether a leader is more likely to use military force or not. In the 
next chapter, I will further discuss these individual characteristics as well as my hypotheses. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
HYPOTHESIS AND METHODS 
 
In this chapter, I will outline the variables used to test any apparent relationships between 
these variables and the use of force. I have collected my own data from numerous resources for 
the purposes of my research. It consists of the specific use of force and the time it was used, the 
President at the time force was used, the President’s psychological profile and characteristics, the 
President’s political party, the Presidents’ mean age while in office, political office prior to 
becoming President, previous foreign policy experience, previous military experience, 
experience in higher education, and profession outside of the political arena. These previously 
mentioned factors are crosstabulated to attempt to determine whether they predispose Presidents 
to use more military force or less military force. 
Neuroticism 
Neuroticism is the first of the “big five” personality traits from the Revised NEO 
Personality Inventory and measures anxiety levels. Stress and anxiety unquestionably can affect 
decision making by either causing individuals to make rash decisions without thinking through 
other options or by causing individuals to become indecisive and procrastinate. For the purposes 
of my study, I believe that high neuroticism scores in Presidents would lead to indecisiveness 
and procrastination and therefore less instances of uses of military force. 
H1: Presidents with high levels of neuroticism are less inclined to use military force. 
Therefore, there will be a correlation between neuroticism and the use of military force. 
 
Extraversion 
 Extraverted Presidents could be seen as ambitious in both domestic and foreign policies, I 
would expect this to be no different when it comes to the use of military force. I believe 
Presidents with high scores of extraversion will be more likely to use military force. 
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H2: Presidents with high levels of extraversion are more inclined to use military force. 
Therefore, there will be a correlation between extraversion and the use of military force. 
 
Openness to Experience 
 
Presidents who are more open to experience would be more likely to take advice from 
their cabinet, of which those members would have foreign policy experience like the Secretary of 
State and potentially military experience with the Secretary of Defense. Therefore, I believe 
Presidents with high scores of openness to experience will be less inclined to use military force. 
H3: Presidents with high levels of openness to experience will be less inclined to use 
military force. Therefore, there will be a correlation between openness to experience and 
the use of military force. 
 
Agreeableness 
 
Like openness to experience, high scores in agreeableness could also decrease the use of 
military force as members of government at all levels may be able to dissuade the President from 
using force. Therefore, I believe Presidents who score low in agreeableness will be more inclined 
to use military force. 
H4: Presidents with low levels of agreeableness will be more inclined to use military 
force. Therefore, there will be a correlation between agreeableness and the use of military 
force. 
 
Conscientiousness 
This personality trait with regards to my research question presents an interesting 
paradox. Theoretically, a President scoring high in conscientiousness would be a President who 
is considered principled and understands what actions would be right and wrong. However, this 
could mean a President could initiate numerous uses of military force for causes believed to be 
noble and righteous. On the opposite side of the spectrum, a President scoring low in 
conscientiousness could also initiate numerous uses of military force indiscriminately and with 
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little regard for the consequences. It’s for these reasons that I believe conscientiousness is not the 
most important psychological determinant to whether a President uses military force or not. 
H5: Presidential scores in conscientiousness make no discernible difference as to whether 
a President uses military force. Therefore, there will be no correlation between 
conscientiousness and the use of military force. 
 
Presidents and their Political Party 
With regards to Presidents and political party, I believe that Presidents who were 
members of the Democratic Party will have been more likely to use military force than 
Presidents who were members of any other political party. I believe it’s very likely for this 
hypothesis to hold true due in part to the modern Democratic party being founded in the early 
decades of the republic. 
H6: Owing in part to its founding in the early decades of the republic, Presidents who 
were members of the Democratic Party will be more inclined to use military force than 
Presidents of any other political party. Therefore there will be a correlation between the 
use of force and the President’s party. 
 
Presidents and their Average Age 
 
To attempt to answer the age-old axiom about whether leaders are more likely to take 
risks in their younger years than their older years, I calculated the average age of each President 
during their terms. I believe younger Presidents will be more likely to use military force. 
H7: Presidents younger than the average age of all Presidents during the duration of their 
Presidency (57.3) will be more likely to use military force. Therefore, there will be a 
correlation between average age and the use of military force. 
 
Presidents and their Last Political Office 
 
Most Presidents, but not all, held political office prior to becoming President. I believe 
those who were formerly Vice Presidents will be less likely to use military force, perhaps being 
tempered by the inclination to use military force or not to use military force by the President 
whom they served. 
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H8: Presidents who formerly served as Vice President will be less inclined to use military 
force. Therefore, there will be correlation a between a President’s last political office and 
the use of military force. 
 
Presidents and Previous Foreign Policy Experience 
 
Owing to their experience in world affairs, Presidents may be tempered by their 
interactions with foreign nations may understand that might does not always equal right, I would 
expect Presidents with previous foreign policy experience to be less likely to use military force. 
H9: Presidents with foreign policy experience will be less inclined to use military force. 
Therefore, there will be a correlation between a President’s previous foreign policy 
experience and the use of military force. 
 
Presidents and Previous Military Experience  
 
Over half of all Presidents had previous military experience. Of those half, many also 
served during wartime. Military experience alone would shape your own personal beliefs, and 
service during wartime would further shape those beliefs. I believe that Presidents with military 
experience would be less likely to use force. 
H10: Presidents with previous military experience will be less inclined to use military 
force. Therefore, there will be a correlation between a President’s previous military 
experience and the use of military force. 
 
Presidents and Higher Education 
 
While nearly every President completed some form of higher education after high school, 
there were some Presidents who did not attain their college degrees. Of those who did not have 
college degrees most still at least partially completed their degree. However, it’s obvious that to 
become President of the United States one must have some level of intelligence and I believe that 
completion of higher education is not an important factor on whether a President uses military 
force or not but I believe there those who have attended higher education will have been more 
likely to use military force. 
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H11: Presidents who attended some form of higher education will have been more likely 
to use force, however this is not an important determinant in which President is more 
inclined to use military force. Therefore, there will be no correlation between a 
President’s completion of higher education and the use of military force. 
 
Presidents and Occupation 
Most Presidents were lawyers. Therefore, I believe that Presidents who were lawyers are 
more inclined to use military force due to simply outnumbering all other professions of other 
Presidents. 
 
H12: Presidents who were lawyers are more inclined to use military force. Therefore, 
there will be a correlation between a President’s previous occupation and the use of 
military force. 
 
Variables 
Use of Force Events 
The use of force events was collected from a report prepared by the Congressional 
Research Service. The CRS provides policy and legal analysis to committees and members of the 
House of Representatives and the Senate. Per the Library of Congress, the CRS “serves the 
Congress throughout the legislative process by providing comprehensive and reliable legislative 
research and analysis that are timely, objective, authoritative and confidential, thereby 
contributing to an informed national legislature.”88 The CRS is non-partisan and each publication 
is subject to a multi-layered review process. The CRS has published “Instances of Use of United 
States Armed Forces Abroad” for several years. When circumstances warrant, the report will be 
updated and was updated twice in 2015 alone. 
The report lists “hundreds of instances in which the United States has used its Armed 
Forces abroad in situations of military conflict or potential conflict or for other than normal 
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peacetime purposes.”89 Covert operations, disaster relief, and routine alliance stationing and 
training exercises are not included in the report. Internal conflicts such as the Whiskey Rebellion 
and the Civil War are not included as the use of military force as in these cases were not used 
abroad but internally. The Revolutionary War was also not included as an instance of use of 
force but it was not explicitly stated why, the likeliest reason being that newly declared United 
States of America did not have widespread political recognition and was essentially an internal 
conflict. The Indian Wars, or as the author described as the “exploration, settlement, and 
pacification of the western part of the United States” are also not included in the list of uses of 
armed forces. The list spans from 1798 beginning with the Quasi-War, an undeclared naval war 
against France, and ends in October 2015 with US Armed Forces intervention in Cameroon. 
I have found it to be the most comprehensive resource about the use of force. The report 
continues to state that the instances of use of force “…differ greatly in number of forces, 
purpose, extent of hostilities, and legal authorization.”90 Essentially, a use of force does not 
require that bullets to be fired, bombs to be dropped, or missiles to be launched to be construed 
as a use of force; numerous events are what could be described simply as saber rattling or 
military maneuvers that are intended to convey a message. It is also important to note that major 
conflicts such as World War II are defined as a single use of force.  Individual battles and events 
that were part of a war are not counted in an overall tally of instances of force being used. Thus, 
as an example from World War II, President Harry S. Truman would not receive more “points” 
than his predecessor, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, for presiding over the bloodiest battle of 
the Pacific Theatre, Okinawa, or for his decision to drop the atomic bomb on the Japanese cities 
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. President Roosevelt and President Truman would equally be 
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assigned World War II as part of their tally of uses of force as Truman continued to preside over 
the war. 
Psychological Profiles – The “Big Five” Traits 
I have approximated as best I could with the resources available to me the psychological 
profile of each President of the United States. However, as the famous quote attributed to Mark 
Twain says, “All generalizations are false, including this one.” But since it would be impossible 
to assign each President a psychological profile with 100% accuracy, I believe the work of 
Steven J. Rubenzer and Thomas R. Faschingbauer has been the most thorough effort to assign 
psychological profiles and determine important characteristics of the Presidents. Together they 
wrote Personality, Character, and Leadership in the White House: Psychologists assess the 
Presidents. They admit that measuring personality cannot be measured with precision but they 
could still be useful as effective instruments. Rubenzer and Faschingbauer tasked biographers, 
journalists, and scholars to complete personality tests for the Presidents that they specifically 
studied. They had these Presidential experts fill out the Revised NEO Personality Inventory 
which explicitly attempts to measure the full range of personality traits including what are known 
as the “big five” traits: neuroticism, extraversion, openness to experience, agreeableness, and 
conscientiousness. 
Neuroticism 
Neuroticism is a personality trait that is related to levels of anxiety. Facets of neuroticism 
include anxiety, angry hostility, depression, self-consciousness, impulsiveness, and 
vulnerability.91 Rubenzer and Faschingbauer describe high scorers of neuroticism as “moody, 
tense, self-conscious, prone to feeling downhearted and discouraged, and have difficulty resisting 
                                                 
91 Steven J. Rubenzer and Thomas R. Faschingbauer, Personality, Character, and Leadership in the White House: 
Psychologists Assess the Presidents (Dulles: Brassey’s Inc, 2004), 10. 
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their impulses.”92 Low scorers are “calm, relaxed, secure, well balanced, and able to see to the 
heart of problems.”93 Presidents with high scores for neuroticism included Richard Nixon and 
Lyndon B. Johnson.94 Presidents with low scores were Franklin D. Roosevelt and Ronald 
Reagan. 
Extraversion 
Extraversion measures how social a President is. Facets of extraversion include warmth, 
gregariousness, assertiveness, activity, excitement seeking, and positive emotions.95 Rubenzer 
and Faschingbauer describe high scorers of extraversion as “sociable, enthusiastic, energetic, 
adventurous, talkative, assertive, and outspoken.”96 Low scorers would be more introverted, 
reserved, and more introspective. Presidents with high scores included Theodore Roosevelt, who 
was more extraverted than 997 out of 1000 average Americans, Bill Clinton, and Warren G. 
Harding were also both extremely extraverted.97 Presidents with low scores included Calvin 
Coolidge, whose introverted and reserved mannerisms earned him the nickname “Silent Cal” 
from the American press, and also included John Quincy Adams and Herbert Hoover.98 
Openness to Experience 
Openness to experience “contrasts poets, philosophers, and artists with farmers, 
machinists, and ‘down-to-earth’ people.”99 Facets of openness to experience include openness to 
fantasy, openness to aesthetics, openness to feelings, openness to actions, openness to ideas, and 
openness to values.100 Openness to experience is the only dimension of the “big five” that is 
                                                 
92 ibid. 7.  
93 ibid. 23. 
94 ibid. 23. 
95 ibid. 11. 
96 ibid. 7.  
97 ibid. 25. 
98 ibid. 25. 
99 ibid. 9. 
100 ibid. 12.  
33 
 
related to intelligence.101  Presidents with high scores in this category include Thomas Jefferson, 
John Quincy Adams, and Abraham Lincoln.102 Jefferson was a Founding Father, writer of the 
Declaration of Independence, and a Renaissance man of sorts during the early years of the 
United States. Quincy Adams was the son of a Founding Father and Lincoln was a self-taught 
lawyer. Presidents with low scores include Andrew Jackson, William Howard Taft, and Harry S. 
Truman.103 Jackson styled himself as a man of the people, Taft was an adherent to the strict 
constructionism philosophy, and Truman never received a Bachelor’s degree. 
Agreeableness 
Facets of agreeableness include trust, straight-forwardness, altruism, compliance, 
modesty, and tender-mindedness.104 High scorers are “sympathetic, kind, forgiving, appreciative, 
trusting, softhearted, modest, and considerate.”105 Low scorers are “stubborn, ruthless, critical, 
skeptical, unkind, demanding, and uncooperative.”106 Presidents with high scores in this category 
included Millard Fillmore, Abraham Lincoln, and Warren G. Harding while Andrew Jackson, 
Lyndon B. Johnson, and Richard Nixon all scored exceptionally low scores either at or below 0.1 
percentile.107 
Conscientiousness 
Conscientiousness measures inner thought. Facets of conscientiousness include 
competence, order, dutifulness, achievement striving, self-discipline, and deliberation.108 High 
scorers are “organized, thorough, hardworking, principled, deliberate, precise, and 
                                                 
101 ibid. 10.  
102 ibid. 26. 
103 ibid. 26. 
104 ibid. 13. 
105 ibid. 10. 
106 ibid. 11.  
107 ibid. 27.  
108 ibid. 14. 
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dependable.”109 Low scorers are “lazy, careless, distractible, inefficient, frivolous, and 
irresponsible.” Presidents with high scores include Woodrow Wilson, George Washington, and 
Jimmy Carter, while John F. Kennedy, Bill Clinton, and Warren G. Harding were ranked with 
the lowest scores.110 Wilson, Washington, and Carter were all relatively scandal-free at a 
personal level. However, the bottom three candidates all had numerous scandals. For Kennedy, it 
was an open secret during his lifetime that he was a womanizer who had numerous affairs from 
White House interns to Hollywood star Marilyn Monroe. Clinton also had an affair with a White 
House intern. Harding had no blemishes on his personal character, but his administration is 
described as one of the most corrupt of all American Presidents. 
The Presidents, Political Parties, and Mean Age 
 The CRS report does not concurrently list each Presidential administration with each use 
of force; I have taken the liberty of doing so. My additional research has revealed that only two 
Presidents did not use any force per the terms of the CRS definition. They were President George 
Washington and President William Henry Harrison. President Washington was seemingly averse 
to the use of force as evidenced by his Proclamation of Neutrality that declared the United States 
neutral during the French Revolutionary Wars. President Washington did personally lead the 
military in response to the Whiskey Rebellion, but as it was an internal dispute it is not included 
in the report’s tally. President William Henry Harrison, who died due to a combination of 
pneumonia and typhoid fever after only thirty days in office, had no opportunity to use military 
force. President Grover Cleveland, the only President to serve non-consecutive terms, will be 
coded as two separate administrations for the sake of simplicity. It would be of interest to my 
research to determine whether President Cleveland’s four years on the outside looking in of the 
                                                 
109 ibid. 11. 
110 ibid. 28.  
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Oval Office provided him with an epiphany to use less force or more force when he returned to 
office. 
Also listed with each President is their corresponding political party. Only five political 
parties have held the Presidency since the founding of the Republic: the Federalist Party, the 
Democratic-Republican Party, the Democratic Party, the Whig Party, and the Republican 
Party.111 President John Tyler, while elected on the Whig ticket as Vice President to William 
Henry Harrison, was expelled from the Whig Party after he ascended to the Presidency when he 
made clear he did not intend the follow the policy proposals of the late President Harrison. This 
makes Tyler one of only two Presidents, the second being George Washington, to have no party 
affiliation. For this reason, I have listed John Tyler as an Independent. The parties are coded 
based on which one had first attained the office of President. Therefore, Federalists are coded 1, 
Democratic-Republicans coded 2, the modern Democratic Party coded 3, Independents coded 4, 
Whigs coded 5, and Republicans coded 6. 
For determining the age of the President, I have decided to use the mean age of the 
President while in office instead of age upon ascension to the office. I have done so to equalize 
the possibility of either Presidents becoming more risk-averse or less risk-averse as they age. I 
believe it is also a much fairer comparison using average age to balance between Presidents who 
served less than two full terms or in the case of President Franklin D. Roosevelt who served three 
full terms and served the first few months of his fourth term before his death. 
Last Political Office 
Nearly every President has held political office prior to becoming President, but there are 
three notable exceptions. President Zachary Taylor, a Major General and Mexican-American 
                                                 
111 The roots of the modern Democratic Party can be traced to the Democratic-Republicans or Jeffersonian 
Republicans, but a clear policy shift emerged after the election of Andrew Jackson, giving birth to the modern 
Democratic Party.  
36 
 
War hero, had no formal political office before he was elected President in 1848 on the Whig 
Party ticket. President Ulysses S. Grant, who led the Union Army during the Civil War to 
victories at Vicksburg and Chattanooga before being appointed commander of all Union forces, 
also held no political office when elected in 1868 as a Republican. Dwight D. Eisenhower, the 
Supreme Allied Commander and one of the principal planners of the invasion of Normandy 
during World War II, was courted by both the Democratic and Republican Parties before 
ultimately being elected President as a Republican in 1952. Besides these three exceptions, every 
single President has held political office ranging from the Vice Presidency, a position in the 
President’s cabinet, House of Representatives or Senate seat, state governorship, and even all the 
way on down to local political offices. The last political offices of the Presidents will be coded as 
follows: 0, no political experience. 1, Vice Presidency. 2, Cabinet position. 3, Congressman or 
Senator. 4, state governor. 5, miscellaneous government appointments. 
Previous Foreign Policy Experience 
Previous foreign policy experience prior to becoming President, surprisingly, is not as 
common as having previous political experience. The cabinet position of Secretary of State was 
once seen as a traditional stepping-stone to the Presidency in the early days of the republic. Six 
former Secretaries of State would go on to become President: Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, 
James Monroe, John Quincy Adams, Martin Van Buren, and James Buchanan. Other Presidents 
with previous foreign policy experience such as ambassadors or envoys to foreign nations 
include John Adams and William Henry Harrison. In addition to being Ambassador to the United 
Nations, George H.W. Bush was also the Director of Central Intelligence for the Central 
Intelligence Agency.  With the elder Bush being the exception, many recent Presidents have not 
held any political office with regards to foreign policy. This previous foreign policy experience 
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will be coded binarily, 1 for previous foreign policy experience and 0 for no previous foreign 
policy experience. 
Previous Military Experience 
Half of all Presidents have served in the United States military to varying degrees. 
Twelve Presidents were previously generals, those being George Washington, Andrew Jackson, 
William Henry Harrison, Zachary Taylor, Franklin Pierce, Andrew Johnson, Ulysses S. Grant, 
Rutherford B Hayes, James A. Garfield, Chester A. Arthur, Benjamin Harrison, and Dwight D. 
Eisenhower. The rest of the Presidents with previous military experience apart from James 
Buchanan served as officers in state militias or the United States military. This previous military 
experience will be coded binarily, 1 for previous military experience and 0 for no previous 
military experience. 
Higher Education and Profession Outside Politics 
A clear majority of Presidents have earned a college degree and often went on to 
complete their law degrees. As far as postgraduate education is concerned, the only President to 
ever earn a Ph.D. was Woodrow Wilson. However, some Presidents never completed formal 
education. The following Presidents never attended college or never completed their degree: 
George Washington, James Monroe, Andrew Jackson, Martin Van Buren, William Henry 
Harrison, Zachary Taylor, Millard Fillmore, Abraham Lincoln, Andrew Johnson, Grover 
Cleveland, William McKinley, and Harry S. Truman. Higher education will be coded binarily, 1 
for completing higher education or 0 for not completing higher education. 
For professions outside of politics, most Presidents were lawyers. Other professions of 
the Presidents included farmers like George Washington and Jimmy Carter, businessmen like 
George H.W. Bush and his son George W Bush, writers such as John F. Kennedy, an educator 
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like Lyndon B. Johnson, and an actor such as Ronald Reagan. Many Presidents, most especially 
those considered Founding Fathers, had multiple professions. Only their primary profession is 
considered. These professions will be coded based on the when they first attained the office of 
President. Lawyers are coded 1, soldiers coded 2, tailors/haberdashers coded 3, educators coded 
4, editor-publishers coded 5, engineers coded 6, farmers coded 7, writers coded 8, actors coded 
9, and businessmen coded 10.  
In the next chapter, I will crosstabulate these variables to attempt and determine whether 
they predispose Presidents to use more military force or less military force. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Presidents and Neuroticism 
 Table 1 shows the results of H1 to determine whether there is correlation between a 
President’s neuroticism levels and the use of military force. I hypothesized that there would be a 
correlation and that Presidents with higher levels of neuroticism would be less inclined to use 
military force. 
Table 1. Uses of Military Force by Neuroticism 
Use of Force Counts 0-24 25-49 50-74 75-100 
 
0-5 
1 
2.33 
( 0.76) 
3 
3.27 
( 0.02) 
2 
2.80 
( 0.23) 
8 
5.60 
( 1.03) 
14 
6-10 
3 
1.33 
( 2.08) 
2 
1.87 
( 0.01) 
2 
1.60 
( 0.10) 
1 
3.20 
( 1.51) 
8 
11-15 
0 
0.83 
( 0.83) 
2 
1.17 
( 0.60) 
1 
1.00 
( 0.00) 
2 
2.00 
( 0.00) 
5 
15+ 
1 
0.50 
( 0.50) 
0 
0.70 
( 0.70) 
1 
0.60 
( 0.27) 
1 
1.20 
( 0.03) 
3 
  5 7 6 12 30 
χ2  =  8.675,     df  =  9,     χ2/df  =  0.96 ,         P(χ2 > 8.675)  =  0.4678 
While Presidents whose neuroticism scores were between the 75th and 100th percentile appeared 
to use military force infrequently, the results show that there is no correlation between levels of 
neuroticism and the use of military force. Therefore, the null hypothesis of no association is not 
rejected and my H1 hypothesis is not supported. 
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Presidents and Extraversion 
 Table 2 shows the results of H2 to determine whether there is correlation between a 
President’s extraversion levels and the use of military force. I hypothesized that there would be a 
correlation and that Presidents with higher levels of extraversion will be more likely to use 
military force. 
Table 2. Uses of Military Force by Extraversion 
Use of Force Counts  0-24% 25-49% 50-74% 75-100% 
 
0-5 
6 
4.20 
( 0.77) 
2 
1.87 
( 0.01) 
1 
1.40 
( 0.11) 
5 
6.53 
( 0.36) 
14 
6-10 
1 
2.40 
( 0.82) 
1 
1.07 
( 0.00) 
2 
0.80 
( 1.80) 
4 
3.73 
( 0.02) 
8 
11-15 
2 
1.50 
( 0.17) 
0 
0.67 
( 0.67) 
0 
0.50 
( 0.50) 
3 
2.33 
( 0.19) 
5 
15+ 
0 
0.90 
( 0.90) 
1 
0.40 
( 0.90) 
0 
0.30 
( 0.30) 
2 
1.40 
( 0.26) 
3 
  9 4 3 14 30 
χ2  =  7.776,     df  =  9,     χ2/df  =  0.86 ,         P(χ2 > 7.776)  =  0.5569 
While Presidents whose extraversion scores were between the 75th and 100th percentile appeared 
more likely to use military force, the results show there is no correlation between levels of 
extraversion and the use of military force. Therefore, the null hypothesis of no association is not 
rejected and my H2 hypothesis is not supported. 
Presidents and Openness to Experience 
 Table 3 shows the results of H3 to determine whether there is correlation between a 
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President’s openness to experience levels and the use of military force. I hypothesized that there 
would be a correlation and that Presidents with higher levels of openness to experience will be 
less likely to use military force. 
Table 3. Uses of Military Force by Openness to Experience 
Use of Force Counts 0-24 25-49 50-74 75-100 
 
0-5 
6 
6.53 
( 0.04) 
2 
2.80 
( 0.23) 
1 
1.87 
( 0.40) 
5 
2.80 
( 1.73) 
14 
6-10 
5 
3.73 
( 0.43) 
3 
1.60 
( 1.22) 
0 
1.07 
( 1.07) 
0 
1.60 
( 1.60) 
8 
11-15 
2 
2.33 
( 0.05) 
1 
1.00 
( 0.00) 
2 
0.67 
( 2.67) 
0 
1.00 
( 1.00) 
5 
15+ 
1 
1.40 
( 0.11) 
0 
0.60 
( 0.60) 
1 
0.40 
( 0.90) 
1 
0.60 
( 0.27) 
3 
  14 6 4 6 30 
χ2  =  12.320,     df  =  9,     χ2/df  =  1.37 ,         P(χ2 > 12.320)  =  0.1959 
While Presidents whose openness to experience scores were between the 75th and 100th 
percentile appeared to be less likely to use military force, the results show there is no correlation 
between levels of extraversion and the use of military force. Therefore, the null hypothesis of no 
association is not rejected and my H3 hypothesis is not supported. 
Presidents and Agreeableness 
 Table 4 shows the results of H4 to determine whether there is a correlation between a 
President’s agreeableness levels and the use of military force. I hypothesized that there would be 
a correlation and that Presidents with higher levels of agreeableness to will be less likely to use 
military force. 
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Table 4.  Uses of Military Force by Agreeableness 
Use of Force Counts 0-24 25-49 50-74 75-100 
 
0-5 
10 
7.00 
( 1.29) 
0 
2.33 
( 2.33) 
2 
3.73 
( 0.80) 
2 
0.93 
( 1.22) 
14 
6-10 
2 
4.00 
( 1.00) 
3 
1.33 
( 2.08) 
3 
2.13 
( 0.35) 
0 
0.53 
( 0.53) 
8 
11-15 
2 
2.50 
( 0.10) 
0 
0.83 
( 0.83) 
3 
1.33 
( 2.08) 
0 
0.33 
( 0.33) 
5 
15+ 
1 
1.50 
( 0.17) 
2 
0.50 
( 4.50) 
0 
0.80 
( 0.80) 
0 
0.20 
( 0.20) 
3 
  15 5 8 2 30 
χ2  =  18.628,     df  =  9,     χ2/df  =  2.07 ,         P(χ2 > 18.628)  =  0.0285* 
 
* p < 0.05 
The results show that Presidents with higher levels of agreeableness were significantly less likely 
to use military force. Additionally, the results show that there is a correlation between 
agreeableness and the use of military force and was statistically significant at p < 0.05. The result 
rejects the null hypothesis of no association and supports my H4 hypothesis.  
Presidents and Conscientiousness 
Table 5 shows the results of H5 to determine whether there is a correlation between a 
President’s conscientiousness levels and the use of military force. I hypothesized that there 
would be no correlation and that conscientiousness scores would make no discernible difference 
as to whether a President would use military force. 
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Table 5. Uses of Military Force by Conscientiousness 
  Use of 
Force # 
0-24 25-49 50-74 75-100 
 
0-5 
1 
2.33 
( 0.76) 
1 
0.93 
( 0.00) 
2 
2.33 
( 0.05) 
10 
8.40 
( 0.30) 
14 
6-10 
2 
1.33 
( 0.33) 
1 
0.53 
( 0.41) 
1 
1.33 
( 0.08) 
4 
4.80 
( 0.13) 
8 
11-15 
0 
0.83 
( 0.83) 
0 
0.33 
( 0.33) 
2 
0.83 
( 1.63) 
3 
3.00 
( 0.00) 
5 
15+ 
2 
0.50 
( 4.50) 
0 
0.20 
( 0.20) 
0 
0.50 
( 0.50) 
1 
1.80 
( 0.36) 
3 
  5 2 5 18 30 
χ2  =  10.433,     df  =  9,     χ2/df  =  1.16 ,         P(χ2 > 10.433)  =  0.3166 
The results show that there is no correlation between conscientiousness and the use of 
military force. The results fail to reject the null hypothesis of no association, which supports my 
H5 hypothesis. 
Presidents and their Political Party 
Table 6 shows the results of H6 to determine whether a President’s political party inclines 
them be more likely to use military force or less likely to use military force. I hypothesized that 
there would be a correlation between political party and the use of military force. 
Table 6. Uses of Military Force by Political Party 
Use of Force 
Counts 
None Federalist 
Democratic-
Republican 
Democratic Whig Republican 
 
0-5 
2 
0.95 
( 1.15) 
1 
0.48 
( 0.57) 
2 
1.91 
( 0.00) 
7 
7.16 
( 0.00) 
3 
1.43 
( 1.72) 
6 
9.07 
( 1.04) 
21 
6-10 
0 
0.55 
0 
0.27 
1 
1.09 
4 
4.09 
0 
0.82 
7 
5.18 
12 
44 
 
( 0.55) ( 0.27) ( 0.01) ( 0.00) ( 0.82) ( 0.64) 
11-15 
0 
0.27 
( 0.27) 
0 
0.14 
( 0.14) 
1 
0.55 
( 0.38) 
1 
2.05 
( 0.53) 
0 
0.41 
( 0.41) 
4 
2.59 
( 0.77) 
6 
15+ 
0 
0.23 
( 0.23) 
0 
0.11 
( 0.11) 
0 
0.45 
( 0.45) 
3 
1.70 
( 0.98) 
0 
0.34 
( 0.34) 
2 
2.16 
( 0.01) 
5 
  2 1 4 15 3 19 44 
χ2  =  11.395,     df  =  15,     χ2/df  =  0.76 ,         P(χ2 > 11.395)  =  0.7241 
The results show that there is no correlation between the use of military force and a 
President’s political party. The null hypothesis of no association is not rejected; therefore, my H6 
hypothesis does not hold true. 
Presidents and their Average Age 
 
Table 7 shows the results of H7 to determine whether there is any correlation between a 
President’s age and their inclination to use military force. I hypothesized that there would be a 
correlation between average age and the use of military force. 
Table 7. Uses of Military Force by Average Age 
 
Use of Force Counts 45-54 55-64 65-74 
 
0-5 
9 
8.11 
( 0.10) 
9 
9.55 
( 0.03) 
3 
3.34 
( 0.03) 
21 
6-10 
2 
4.64 
( 1.50) 
8 
5.45 
( 1.19) 
2 
1.91 
( 0.00) 
12 
11-15 
4 
2.32 
( 1.22) 
1 
2.73 
( 1.09) 
1 
0.95 
( 0.00) 
6 
15+ 
2 
1.93 
( 0.00) 
2 
2.27 
( 0.03) 
1 
0.80 
( 0.05) 
5 
Table 6. continued 
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  17 20 7 44 
χ2  =  5.258,     df  =  6,     χ2/df  =  0.88 ,         P(χ2 > 5.258)  =  0.5112 
Although the results show that younger Presidents were more likely to use military force, 
there is no correlation between average age and the propensity to use military force. The null 
hypothesis of no association is not rejected; therefore, my H7 hypothesis does not hold true. 
Presidents and their Last Political Office 
 
Table 8 shows the results of H8 to determine if a President’s last political office would 
predispose them to be more likely to use military force. I hypothesized that there would be a 
correlation between a President’s last political office and the use of military force. 
Table 8. Uses of Military Force by President’s Last Political Office 
 
Use of 
Force 
Counts 
None 
Vice 
Presidency 
Cabinet Legislative 
State 
Governor 
 
Misc. 
 
0-5 
1 
1.43 
( 0.13) 
8 
6.68 
( 0.26) 
2 
2.39 
( 0.06) 
6 
5.25 
( 0.11) 
3 
4.30 
( 0.39) 
1 
0.95 
( 0.00) 
21 
6-10 
2 
0.82 
( 1.71) 
3 
3.82 
( 0.18) 
1 
1.36 
( 0.10) 
3 
3.00 
( 0.00) 
2 
2.45 
( 0.08) 
1 
0.55 
( 0.38) 
12 
11-15 
0 
0.41 
( 0.41) 
3 
1.91 
( 0.62) 
2 
0.68 
( 2.55) 
1 
1.50 
( 0.17) 
0 
1.23 
( 1.23) 
0 
0.27 
( 0.27) 
6 
15+ 
0 
0.34 
( 0.34) 
0 
1.59 
( 1.59) 
0 
0.57 
( 0.57) 
1 
1.25 
( 0.05) 
4 
1.02 
( 8.67) 
0 
0.23 
( 0.23) 
5 
  3 14 5 11 9 2 44 
 
χ2  =  20.087,     df  =  15,     χ2/df  =  1.34 ,         P(χ2 > 20.087)  =  0.1686 
Table 7. continued 
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The results show that there is no correlation between the use of military force and a President’s 
prior political office. The null hypothesis of no association is not rejected; therefore, my H8 
hypothesis does not hold true. 
Presidents and Previous Foreign Policy Experience 
Table 9 shows the results of H9 to determine whether a President’s previous foreign 
policy experience has a correlation with the use of military force. I hypothesized that there would 
be a correlation between a President’s previous foreign policy experience and the use of military 
force. 
Table 9. Uses of Military Force by Previous Foreign Policy Experience 
Use of Force Counts Yes No 
 
0-5 
5 
4.30 
( 0.12) 
16 
16.70 
( 0.03) 
21 
6-10 
2 
2.45 
( 0.08) 
10 
9.55 
( 0.02) 
12 
11-15 
2 
1.23 
( 0.49) 
4 
4.77 
( 0.13) 
6 
15+ 
0 
1.02 
( 1.02) 
5 
3.98 
( 0.26) 
5 
  9 35 44 
χ2  =  2.148,     df  =  3,     χ2/df  =  0.72 ,         P(χ2 > 2.148)  =  0.5422 
Although Presidents who had foreign policy experience were less likely to use military force 
than those who did not have foreign policy experience, the results show there is no correlation 
between Presidents’ previous foreign policy experience and their use of military force. The null 
hypothesis of no association is not rejected; therefore, my H9 hypothesis does not hold true. 
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Presidents and Previous Military Experience 
Table 10 shows the results of H10 to determine whether a President’s previous military 
experience has a correlation with the use of military force. I hypothesized that there would be a 
correlation between a President’s previous military experience and the use of military force. 
Table 10. Uses of Military Force by Previous Military Experience 
Use of Force Counts Yes No 
 
0-5 
16 
14.80 
( 0.10) 
5 
6.20 
( 0.23) 
21 
6-10 
9 
8.45 
( 0.04) 
3 
3.55 
( 0.08) 
12 
11-15 
4 
4.23 
( 0.01) 
2 
1.77 
( 0.03) 
6 
15+ 
2 
3.52 
( 0.66) 
3 
1.48 
( 1.57) 
5 
  31 13 44 
χ2  =  2.720,     df  =  3,     χ2/df  =  0.91 ,         P(χ2 > 2.720)  =  0.4368 
The results show there is no correlation between a President’s prior military experience and the 
use of military force. The null hypothesis of no association is not rejected; therefore, my H10 
hypothesis does not hold true. 
Presidents and Higher Education 
 Table 11 shows the results of H11 to determine whether a President’s completion of 
higher education has a correlation with the use of military force. I hypothesized that there would 
not be a correlation between a President’s previous completion of higher education and the use 
of military force owing to the notion that those who become President of the United States are of 
48 
 
higher intelligence compared to the average American, regardless if they had a formal education. 
Table 11. Uses of Military Force by Completion of Higher Education 
Use of Force Counts Yes No 
 
0-5 
15 
16.70 
( 0.17) 
6 
4.30 
( 0.68) 
21 
6-10 
9 
9.55 
( 0.03) 
3 
2.45 
( 0.12) 
12 
11-15 
6 
4.77 
( 0.32) 
0 
1.23 
( 1.23) 
6 
15+ 
5 
3.98 
( 0.26) 
0 
1.02 
( 1.02) 
5 
  35 9 44 
χ2  =  3.831,     df  =  3,     χ2/df  =  1.28 ,         P(χ2 > 3.831)  =  0.2803 
The results show that there is no correlation between a President’s completion of higher 
education and the use of military force. The null hypothesis of no association is not rejected, 
which supports my H11 hypothesis. 
Presidents and Occupation 
 Table 12 shows the results of H12 to determine whether a President’s occupation outside 
of politics has a correlation with the use of military force. I had hypothesized that Presidents who 
were lawyers would be more inclined to use military force. 
Table 12. Uses of Military Force by Occupation 
Use of Force Counts Lawyers All Others 
 
0-5 
13 
12.89 
( 0.00) 
8 
8.11 
( 0.00) 
21 
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6-10 
7 
7.36 
( 0.02) 
5 
4.64 
( 0.03) 
12 
11-15 
5 
3.68 
( 0.47) 
1 
2.32 
( 0.75) 
6 
15+ 
2 
3.07 
( 0.37) 
3 
1.93 
( 0.59) 
5 
  27 17 44 
χ2  =  2.233,     df  =  3,     χ2/df  =  0.74 ,         P(χ2 > 2.233)  =  0.5255 
Although lawyers used military force more than all other occupations combined, the results show 
there is no correlation between a President’s occupation outside of politics and the use of 
military force. The null hypothesis of no association is not rejected; therefore, my H12 hypothesis 
does not hold true. 
Discussion 
 The results show that eleven of the twelve tests were statistically not significant, 
indicating that party affiliation, previous experience, and psychological characteristics generally 
do not have any significant effect as to whether a President is more prone to use military force or 
less prone to use military force. The only exception was levels of agreeableness, which showed 
there appeared to be a correlation between those who had high percentile scores in agreeableness 
and the use of military force. It is important to note that due to the small sample size that was 
available, forty-five presidencies overall and just thirty presidencies in the case of psychological 
characteristics, there may in fact be correlations between more of the variables that are masked 
by the limited number of observations available. Horowitz et al. did find correlations when 
testing for world leaders, but my research indicates this finding may not apply to American 
Presidents. 
Table 12. continued 
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Neuroticism 
 High neuroticism scores from the NEO Personalized Inventory test would indicate a 
President would be more prone to experiencing negative feelings. I believed that if a President 
was more prone to neurotic bouts their decisions as commander-in-chief would be significantly 
affected. While in a depressive state a President may delay his decision to use force or fail to 
decide altogether. Eight Presidents who scored over the 75th percentile in neuroticism used 
military force between zero to five times, the highest count in the crosstabulation. However, no 
correlation was found between neuroticism and the use of military force. Neuroticism would 
seem to be a weak determinant because a President who is less neurotic and calmer would still 
use as little military force as a President who is more neurotic and more erratic. There are also 
times when military force is used in response to an attack from another nation where a President, 
no matter how neurotic he may be, would have no choice but to respond with military force in 
the face of mounting pressure from members of government and the American public. 
Extraversion 
Assertiveness is the key facet of extraversion that I feel is most important to whether a 
President would be more or less likely to use military force. An assertive President would make 
decisions quicker than someone who is not as extraverted and therefore likely to be less 
assertive. President Theodore Roosevelt, who scored in the 99.97th percentile, used military force 
fifteen times. President Bill Clinton, who scored in the 99.90th percentile, used military force 
sixty-five times, more than any other President. However, they were the only two Presidents 
between the 75-100th percentile to use military force fifteen times or more; five other Presidents 
who were just as extraverted used military force less than five times. Further evidence supporting 
the conclusion that extraversion is not an important determinant is the comparison between 
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President Theodore Roosevelt and President Calvin Coolidge. As mentioned, President 
Roosevelt was more extraverted than 9,997 out of 10,000 people and used military force fifteen 
times. President Coolidge, so famous for his quiet demeanor he was nicknamed “Silent Cal” by 
the press, scored the lowest percentile score of any President in extraversion at the 0.4th 
percentile. Despite this, President Coolidge had thirteen uses of military force, only two less than 
President Theodore Roosevelt. Overall, no correlation was found between extraversion and the 
use of military force. 
Openness to Experience 
 For Presidents with high scores on openness to experience, I would have expected them 
to use military force sparingly. Presidents with high openness to experience in theory should be 
intellectually sound and value experiences of their own personal life as well as the experiences of 
others. This is important for when the President would receive military advice, for if he does not 
have military experience and has not faced the horrors of war he could still be receptive to advice 
from members of his cabinet or other positions of power such as the Joint Chiefs of Staff who 
may have been deployed in combat. Of the six Presidents who scored between the 75th and 100th 
percentiles in openness to experience, five of them used military force less than five times. But 
the results still showed that numerous Presidents with low openness to experience also tended to 
use less military force. Overall there was no significant correlation between the use of military 
force and openness to experience. The reasoning may be that those Presidents with less openness 
to experience may be more conservative and less resistant to changing the status quo; the use of 
military force would certainly change any status quo between the United States and the nation 
the action is taken against. 
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Agreeableness 
 Agreeableness was the only statistically significant variable in this research. There were 
only two Presidents who scored between the 75th and 100th percentile, Presidents Millard 
Fillmore and Abraham Lincoln, who both used military force less than five times. A President 
who is more agreeable would be more likely to accept the advice of his cabinet and other 
members of government. A President who is less agreeable would be much less cooperative and 
perhaps even act ruthlessly as commander-in-chief. Most Presidents did not score such high 
levels of agreeableness as generally speaking very few politicians who aspire to become 
President could be described as kind and trusting, with the exceptions being Fillmore and 
Lincoln. 
Conscientiousness 
Conscientiousness had no significant correlation with the use of military force, as I had 
hypothesized. The most significant reason for this result may be an interesting paradox. A 
President with high scores in conscientiousness could be viewed as a principled individual with 
great moral character. With this reasoning a conscientious President could act in two different 
ways. A President with a good conscience, understanding the depravity of war and conflict, 
could be less hesitant to use military force. However, a President with a good conscience could 
also potentially be just as willing to use military force as a President who lacks a conscience if he 
believes that his use of military force in his pursuit of a noble goal. This may best describe uses 
of military force that are approved by the United Nations or described as humanitarian 
interventions. 
Political Parties 
 There are numerous reasons why political parties may not be the best determinant of the 
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use of military force. The two major political parties in the United States today, the Democratic 
and the Republican parties, have proven to be lasting institutions. The modern Democratic Party 
was founded in 1828 and the Republican Party was founded in 1854. By attempting to correlate 
the use of military force by political party, one would have to operate under the assumption that 
party philosophy and policy remained stagnant. But since both major parties are over 150 years 
old, their policies have clearly changed since their founding; the Democratic Party of Jackson 
was not the same Democratic Party of Obama and the Republican Party of Lincoln was not the 
same Republican Party of Donald Trump. While the Federalist, Democratic-Republican, and 
Whig parties’ political relevancy was much shorter and their policies may be easier to pinpoint, it 
is very difficult to make any inferences as to whether Presidents of these parties were more 
inclined to use military force. Compared to the two major parties of today the minor parties had 
significantly fewer individuals as President, thus making it difficult to find a correlation due to 
small sample size. With only forty-five presidencies throughout American history to date, the 
sample size is too small to detect effects that could result in statistically significant inferences. 
Average Age 
 The results for average age were complexing. One would expect younger Presidents to be 
much more aggressive but no correlations were found, suggesting that the age of the President 
made no discernible difference. Presidents who had an average age between forty-five and fifty-
four years old did use more military force than the other two age brackets. This would appear to 
contradict Horowitz et al.’s research that showed a correlation between age and a leader’s 
decision to use force and contradicts their finding that older leaders were more likely to use 
military force. The forty-five to fifty-four age bracket is also significantly affected by President 
Bill Clinton and President Barack Obama, who used significantly more military force than most 
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Presidents. Unlike my research, Horowitz et al. did not limit the selection of their leaders to 
American Presidents, but leaders from across the world, so average age could simply not have a 
correlation in the United States but have correlation for other world leaders. 
Last Political Office 
 The results appeared to show that former Vice Presidents were the most hesitant to use 
force. Eight Presidents who were previously Vice Presidents used force zero to five times during 
their administration. Regardless, the data showed no clear correlation between a President’s last 
political office and their use of force. I have found no research in either support or opposition of 
my argument. One explanation for my finding of no correlation could be that while there are 
previous political offices that allow for politicians to gain executive experience, no prior position 
could prepare someone for all the powers the Presidency has to offer. 
Previous Foreign Policy Experience 
 Presidents with previous foreign policy experience were responsible for only 12.8% of all 
uses of military force while Presidents without previous foreign policy experience were 
responsible for 87.2% of all uses of military force. The data still showed no correlation as to 
whether this made a President more predisposed to use military force. I would have expected a 
correlation, as Horowitz et al. wrote that when information isn’t readily available a leader would 
rely on experience.112 
Previous Military Experience 
 Presidents with military experience used more military force than Presidents without 
military experience. Uses of military force by Presidents with military experience accounted for 
51.9% of all uses of military force since 1798 compared to 48.1% of uses of military force 
                                                 
112 Michael C. Horowitz, Allan C. Stam, and Cali M. Ellis, Why Leaders Fight. (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2015), 10. 
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initiated by Presidents without military experience. The data still showed no correlation as to 
whether this made a President more predisposed to use military force. This would seem to 
contradict Horowitz et al., who claimed “…the single leader background experience most 
plausibly relevant to the initiation of military conflict is whether a leader had prior military 
service.” But in defense of Horowitz et al., they also analyzed the effects of leaders who had 
military experience with combat experience and leaders without combat experience while there 
was no such distinction in my data. One reason for a lack of correlation in my research could be 
that the President is not necessarily the sole civilian leader of the American military as there are 
other departments and agencies responsible for influencing military affairs. This result in turn 
becomes confusing because the studies by Feaver and Gelpi have shown that American 
policymakers with military experience would be less likely to use military force. 
Higher Education 
 The finding that a President’s completion of higher education had no correlation and did 
not predispose them to use more or less military force matched Horowitz et al.’s findings. In fact, 
they found that there was weak correlation to suggest completion of higher education could 
result in using more military force.113 Because a clear majority of Presidents had completed 
higher education I did not expect to find any correlation. I considered the presence of higher 
education to be the weakest determinant on the use of military force. Of the few Presidents that 
did not complete higher education, they were either self-educated or had partially completed 
their education before entering politics or other ventures. Regardless if a President had 
completed higher education or not, to become President they must obviously had to display some 
level of intelligence for the voters to elect them. It would be illogical to suggest that President 
Abraham Lincoln did not display generally high intelligence just because he did not have formal 
                                                 
113 ibid. 145. 
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education. In a study conducted for the previous forty-two men who had been President, each of 
them has been estimated to have an IQ level higher than the average American; no President had 
an IQ score estimated to be lower than 110.114 
Occupation 
 No correlation was found between occupation and the use of military force. Making 
inferences from occupation is very difficult as an overwhelming majority of Presidents were 
previously lawyers. While I attempted to choose a Presidents primary occupation before politics, 
many Presidents were not just lawyers and held many professions in their lifetime. We once 
again run into the limitations of studying American presidents as some Presidents were the only 
Presidents to have a certain occupation.  President Ronald Reagan has been the only President 
whose primary occupation was acting. While President Reagan was responsible for seventeen 
uses of military force, more uses of military force than several other Presidents combined, it 
cannot be inferred that previously being an actor as your primary occupation predisposes you to 
use more military force compared to Presidents who weren’t actors. The same principle can be 
applied to Presidents who were soldiers, tailors/haberdashers, educators, editor-publishers, 
engineers, and businessmen, as the Presidents with these professions were less than half of all 
Presidents. Regardless of profession, the lack of correlation between occupation and the use of 
force makes previous occupations a very weak determinant. 
Conclusions 
 Overall, the results show that individual factors and personal characteristics may give 
little indication or its effects are overstated as to whether a President is more prone to use 
military force or less prone to use military force. Many of the results contradict existing 
                                                 
114 Simonton, Dean Keith. “Presidential IQ, Openness, Intellectual Brilliance, and Leadership: estimates and 
Correlations for 42 U.S. Chief Executives” International Society of Political Psychology Vol. 27, No. 4 (2006). 516.  
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literature, but due to the small sample size of American presidencies the results may not be truly 
representative. At best, it can be inferred that American Presidents aren’t as significantly affected 
by individual factors and personal characteristics compared to other world leaders. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This research investigated whether individual factors were the most effective explanation 
for the propensity of Presidents of the United States to use military force, including whether 
psychological characteristics, political party, average age while in office, last political office, 
previous foreign policy experience, previous military experience, completion of higher 
education, and occupation made them more predisposed to do so. 
The theory for my research drew from existing literature, primarily from Why Leaders 
Fight by Michael C. Horowitz, Allan C. Stam, and Cali M. Ellis. They wrote that the early 
experiences in life that a leader would have would affect their decision-making processes 
because in many foreign policy situations there would be unknown information concealed within 
a fog of war. The research of Steven J. Rubenzer and Thomas R. Faschingbauer was also 
utilized, as they scored each President’s “big five” personality characteristics with the help of 
Presidential experts to determine and predict how successful a President may be. The work of 
Peter D. Feaver and Christopher Gelpi was also utilized, as their book Choosing Your Battles 
showed that American policymakers with military experience would be less likely to use military 
force. 
I hypothesized that a fair majority of individual factors would correlate with the 
President’s use of military force. The only factors I believed did not hold any correlation were 
the President’s completion of higher education and conscientiousness scores. The uses of force 
were collected from a report by the Congressional Research Service that listed all uses of 
military force from 1798 to 2015. The uses of force by each President were then cross-tabulated 
with the individual factors I was investigating. Although the President ultimately makes the final 
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decision to use military force, the results showed that individual characteristics are irrelevant or 
its effects severely overstated. The only factor that was statistically significantly correlated with 
the use of military force was agreeableness. These results would indicate that other factors, such 
as societal factors, governmental and bureaucratic factors, and external factors have more or at 
least equal impact on Presidents’ decisions to use military force. The purpose of my research was 
not to discount any other factors but to attempt to find evidence that individual factors were the 
most important. 
President Trump 
On November 8, 2016, businessman Donald Trump defeated Hillary Clinton in the 
United States Presidential election after securing more than the 270 electoral votes necessary to 
win. Mr. Trump was duly sworn in as the 45th President of the United States on January 20, 
2017. At seventy years old, Donald Trump is the oldest President to be elected in American 
history. A businessman by occupation, he parlayed his fame by appearing on popular television 
shows like “Lifestyles of the Rich and Famous” and his own reality TV show “The Apprentice” 
that made “The Donald” a familiar figure to the average American family in the mid-2000s. 
President Trump held no previous political office and he is the first President since Dwight D. 
Eisenhower to have no political experience before ascending to the Presidency. Trump is also the 
first President to not have any combination of political experience, military experience, or 
foreign policy experience altogether. Trump completed his education at the Wharton School of 
Business at the University of Pennsylvania. As it relates to psychological character, Trump is 
undoubtedly an extreme extravert by judging his public demeanor. It cannot be properly 
determined whether Trump is highly neurotic, as there are no trademark depressive tendencies 
that he exhibits, but Trump will respond with verbal attacks if he feels he has been verbally 
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attacked as well. Trump’s conscientiousness may be indeterminable but he was certainly known 
to be a ruthless businessman. Trump would likely score low in agreeableness, as he strove to 
make the best deals possible for himself and his business ventures. Trump’s level of openness 
may vary; he could score low due to his potential low level of agreeableness but often the best 
businessmen are those who are receptive to changes in the market. 
Trump was one of the most controversial and outspoken candidates that has ever run for 
higher office in the history of the republic. His character and temperament for the office of 
President have been called into question repeatedly. Trump frequently bombastically attacked 
opponents of his campaign. Among many other examples that can be listed, Trump responded to 
criticisms from Senator John McCain of Arizona with a vicious personal attack at The Family 
Leadership Summit in Ames, Iowa, in 2015. Trump stated that McCain was not actually a war 
hero during his service in the Vietnam War and claimed that he was only a war hero because the 
North Vietnamese captured him after the A4-Skyhawk McCain was piloting was shot down. 
Trump also frequently played to the crowd at his campaign rallies across the nation with simple 
catchphrases such as his oft repeated proclamation that together they would make America great 
again and frequently insinuated that he would imprison Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton 
after beating her in the election. While it appeared Trump lacked substance to his policies, his 
mannerisms and actions gave him an air of authenticity that his supporters believed other 
politicians did not have. He was not afraid of what he wanted to say and refused to apologize for 
nearly everything he said as a candidate. 
The question remains how successful and effective Donald Trump, as a CEO, will be as 
President of the United States. As fate would have it, Rubenzer and Faschingbauer devoted a 
small section in their book twelve years before Donald Trump ever ran for President that was 
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titled “The Donald for President? The CEO Metaphor.” They wrote “the most successful 
presidents have been ambitious, intelligent, assertive, and competent—but not necessarily 
straightforward or brimming with integrity.”115 In a study by Ones, Hough, and Viswesvaran, 
managers and CEOs personally completed a test similar to the NEO Personalized Inventory. The 
results showed that these CEOs all scored high in assertiveness, energy level, and achievement 
orientation.116 Of the NEO Personality traits, the authors state that CEOs would exhibit low 
openness to experience, as openness to experience was not a factor in determining who a 
successful CEO would be while openness to experience was important in determining who a 
successful President would be.117 
Limitations, Future Research, and Final Thoughts 
Unless Jimmy Carter, George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, Barack Obama, 
and Donald Trump all are willing to subject themselves to a psychological study, it will be 
impossible to correctly determine their percentile scores in the “big five” personality traits of our 
living former Presidents and our current President. Instead, experts of their administrations must 
assign scores to them. Likewise, for Presidents who are no longer alive, experts can also only 
approximate their percentile scores as best they can. The Revised NEO Personality Inventory 
allows for the test to be taken by a third party, but it’s accuracy could be open to interpretation; 
nonetheless this option remains the best available to researchers. 
In addition to psychological character scores, one future research area that may merit 
investigation is an analysis of Presidential verbal syntax and a correlation with the use of military 
force. The public papers and speeches of the Presidents are readily available. Social Science 
                                                 
115 Steven J. Rubenzer and Thomas R. Faschingbauer, Personality, Character, and Leadership in the White House: 
Psychologists Assess the Presidents (Dulles: Brassey’s Inc, 2004), 50 
116 Ibid. 51 
117 ibid. 51 
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Automation Inc. provides many schemes available to analyze text, including the Leadership Trait 
Analysis Scheme, the Verbs in Context System for Operational Code, the Motivations Scheme, 
the Conceptual/Integrative Complexity scheme, and the Verbal Behavior Analysis. This may 
prove useful since, as mentioned previously, Presidents will not be willing to partake in 
academic studies. 
Although the prospects of a Trump presidency may be horrifying to many, the results of 
this research show that the Office of President is not significantly affected by the President 
himself due to his psychological characteristics, political party, average age while in office, last 
political office, previous foreign policy experience, previous military experience, completion of 
higher education, and occupation. Even if the President’s personal effects are overstated, the 
Presidency still has many checks on power including from the other branches of government as 
well as from the Presidency itself as an institution. Societal factors can also constrain a President, 
including the media as well as the American public. Combined with the current state of political 
gridlock that exists largely because of the American constitutional structure, we may yet remain 
protected from any one individual. 
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